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President George Bush unveiled a new national security
strategy for the United States in his August 2, 1990 speech at
the Aspen Institute in Colorado. The national security strategy
concepts he unveiled at Aspen would be revolutionary and have
direct and dramatic impacts on NATO and the rest of the world.
Essentially, the President opened the door to a total reex-
amination of America's role in the world and its overall military
capability. The historical parallel is the British reorientation
in the first decade of the 20th Century from strategic focus on
colonies to Europe. As Clausewitz wrote, war has ". . . its own
grammar, but not its own logic." The old political logic of the
Cold War has changed - it is now time to change the military
grammar.
U.S. defense policy will be based upon four major elements:
deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and reconstitu-
tion. Rather than deploy forces at the levels maintained since
WWII, under this new national security strategy the United States
would maintain a much smaller active and reserve force mix pri-
marily focused on world-wide major contingency operations -- not
a Europe-centered global war with the USSR. If forces were
required to fight a major war against the Soviet Union, the U.S.
assumes that there would be sufficient time to reconstitute them.
Specifically, the President has apparently accepted the consensus
of his intelligence community that the Soviet Union would need
"at least one to two years or longer to regenerate the capability
for a European theater-wide offensive or a global conflict."'2
The U.S. will, therefore, have two year's warning for a Europe-
centered global war with the USSR.
5OURCES OF THE NEW STRATEGY
Rather than having a single or even a few documents that we
can refer to understand the new national security strategy and
the associated force structure, there are a series of speeches,
articles, and reports that must be consulted if one is to get the
complete story. To properly understand these documents, one must
read them in sequence in order to see how the concepts evolved
over time. The sequence starts with the President's Aspen speech
on August 2. Generally ignored by media due to Iraq's invasion
of Kuwait on the sane day, the concepts outlined in the Presi-
dent's speech were brief and visionary - destined to be full
developed by official spokesmen in the following months.
Only limited commentary about the new national security
strategy or force structure appeared in the U.S. media until the
February DoD testimony to Congress. The U.S. press had been
otherwise engaged in major defense-associated reporting of events
in the Middle East. On the other hand, the Soviet press has
given both subjects wide coverage.
Following this February testimony, the 1991 SECDEF Annual
Report to the President and the Congress was issued, although it
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is dated January. This report specifically addresses the new
national security strategy and provides a force structure that is
designed for budgetary and political give and take. For those
that had still not yet understood that strategy and force struc-
ture were changing, a copy of the President's Aspen speech was
provided as an annex. By the end of March, the Joint Chiefs of
Staff issued their 1991 Joint Military Net Assessment (JMNA).
A number of things stands out, by reviewing the primary
source documents. The first is that this appears to be a very
top-down re-direction in defense strategy and force structure.
From the public record, it appears that there were a handful of
individuals that orchestrated the new concepts and that there
were only a few authorized spokesmen. The usual indicators of a
debate are absent - discussion by other senior military officials
does not appear until well after the new concepts have been
articulated in public.
A second matter that stands out is that the new national
security strategy does not have a name. Inside the Washington
beltway, the strategy is known as the "new strategy" or the
"President's strategy." The strategy has also been referred to,
informally, as the "Aspen Strategy," the "reconstitution strate-
gy," and the "strategy for the new world order," but it appears
that the Adninistration will let academia, or the press, select
the title that will appear in the history books. For the pur-
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poses of this paper, the strategy is uniformly referred to as the
"new national security strategy."
By the beginning of May, sufficient details of the Presi-
dent's new strategic concepts were available to make an in-depth
assessment of the new national security strategy's impact. It
should be acknowledged that the strategy lacks a formal name and
that the internal debate and discussion within the Administration
has not yet ended. Rather than a "bottom-up" product of endless
hours of staff work involving all the major defense and industri-
al participants, the new national security strategy is very much
in the model of recent shifts in military doctrine in the USSR -
with perhaps even more debate in the USSR that has yet occurred
in the United States.
THE PRESIDENT'S NED NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY
The major factor underlying the reexamination of America's
role in the world, and basic national security strategy, is the
recognition by the Congress and the Administration that the level
of resources devoted to defense in the last decade cannot be sus
tained. American defense spending will apparently be reduced on
the order of 25% under the new national security strategy and
the "base" force. This reduction is not simply the low end of a
periodic cycle of fluctuating defense expenditures -- it is a
recognition that the total amount of resources devoted to defense
need not be as high as long as the current political climate
remains with us.
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Another fundamental component of the President's new nation-
al security strategy is that, assuming a two years warning of a
Europe-centered global war with the USSR, the U.S. can generate
wholly new forces - to rebuild or "reconstitute" them if neces-
sary. Specifically, current forces deemed unnecessary, will be
disbanded, not put into the reserves, since the risk is deemed
acceptable.
Reconstitution is not the same thing as mobilization or
regeneration - it is more like what the United Kingdom had
planned during the 1930s when it assumed that up to ten years of
strategic warning would be available. New defense manufacturing
capability and new forces and military would be built; essential-
ly from the ground floor up. Preserving this capability will
mean protecting our infrastructure and the defense industrial
base, preserving our lead in critical technologies, and stockpil-
ing critical materials. Preserving our alliance structure is
another element of our ability to reconstitute a more significant
forward-based military presence when, and if, it is ever again
required.
The shift in focus from the Soviet threat and a European
centered global war is a major change in both program and war
planning. We will justify why we procure defense programs for
reasons other than those routinely used since the end of World
War II.
The estimated two-year warning is predicated upon the as-
sumptions that all Soviet ground and air forces will withdraw to
the homeland, that a CFE-like parity will exist from the Atlantic
to the Urals, that the Soviet Union will remain inwardly focused,
and that NATO and its member states intelligence apparatus are
functioning.
Another area of emphasis in the new national security
strategy is emphasis on technological breakthroughs that will
change military art. SECDEF Dick Cheney first addressed this in
his February remarks to Congress. Changes in military art oc-
curred during the inter-war years with the development of blitz-
krieg, carrier-based strike naval air, and amphibious warfare
capabilities. The Soviet military has long discussed the "Revo-
±ution in Military Affairs" that occurred after World War II and
the advent of nuclear weapons and long-range means of deliver.
Senior Soviet military officers have been warning of another
"revolution" in the near future.3 After the performance of U.S.
weapons during Operation DESERT STORM, it appears that their
worst fears were justified. The coming revolution will present
enormous challenges and opportunities in the area of doctrinal
and strategy development.
One of General Colin L. Powell's more frequent themes in his
writings and speeches over the past year has been that of endur-
ing realities and emerging defense needs. Under the category of
enduring reality, the CJCS lists Soviet military power, vital
interests across the Atlantic, in Europe and the Middle East, and
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in the Pacific, and the unknown threat - the crisis that no one
expected. The new national security strategy and the associated
"base" force are designed to meet these needs by providing a less
Soviet/European-centered and more flexible military capability
which will meet America's security requirements as we enter the
next Century.
The cornerstone of American defense strategy will remain
deterrence of aggression and coercion against the U.S. and its
allies and friends. Deterrence is achieved by convincing a
potential adversary that the cost of aggression, at any level,
exceeds any possibility of gain. To achieve this goal, the U.S.
will continue its modernization of strategic nuclear forces and
associated command, control, aid communications capabilities.
The U.S. nuclear deterrence strategy will remain committed
to fostering nuclear stability, where no nation feels the need to
use nuclear weapons in a first-strike. The U.S. remains commit-
ted to improving its strategic nuclear defensive capabilities.
One new area for strategic nuclear warfare will be to respond
flexibly to lower levels of aggression. Strategic defenses can
be effective in countering the growing threat of ballistic mis-
siles from nations other than the USSR.
Deterrence is often thought to only involve nuclear weapons,
but under the new national security strategy, we should expect to
see further investigation of the deterrence of conventional
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warfare without the explicit threat to use nuclear weapons.
-)ther major elements of the new national security strategy
inciude fcrwa-d presence, crisis rasponse and collective securi-
ty.
There is a risk that the end of the Cold War may bring an
increased risk of regional conflicts and a greater degree of
unpredictability in the international security environment.
Today's crises are extremely dangerous due to the proliferation
of advanced weaponry and weapons of mass destruction and the
demonstrated willingness of Third World nations to use them.
U.S. crisis response forces will provide presence with the abili-
ty to reinforce with sufficient forces to prevent a potentially
major crisis from escalating or to resolve favorably less demand-
ing conflicts.
For ease of budget discussion, the U.S. often has used an
illustrative planning sc-nario. Any planning for contingency
responses by the U.S. should include the ability to react to more
than one "canned" predicament or a single scenario. The JCS have
nov. developed a family of likely (and perhaps even unlikely)
events for which the U.S. may elect to commit military forces.
The conventional conflict scenarios now used by the JCS are
contained in this year's JMNA. They range from peacetir-e engage-
ment to war escalating from a European crisis with full mobiliza-
tion. Contingencies include: (1) counter-insurgency; (2) lesser
regional contingencies, w.ith two sub-cases (2,000 and 6000 nauti-
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cal miles from the U.S.); (3) a major regional contingencies in
Korea; and (4) a major regional contingency in Southwest Asia.
The JCS recognize that not all crises will evolve the same.
The JMNA outlines four possible types of crises: (1) a slow-
building crisis; (2) a fast-rising crisis; (3) imminent conflict;
and (4) conflict. The length and intensity of combat, for plan-
ning purposes, is assumed to be 450 days for counter-insurgency,
90 days of low-mid intensity for lesser regional contingencies,
120 days of mid-high intensity for major regional contingencies,
and >50 days of mid-high intensity for a war escalating from a
European crisis.
Responses to these contingencies are contained in a series
of measured response options. The types of response could in-
clude a flexible minimal force deterrent response, a major deter-
rent response (Operation DESERT SHIELD), and more worst-case
responses where combat is undertaken soon after the insertion of
troops or simultaneously. This program of types of contingencies
and measured responses appears to be a building-block and force
sequencing approach to crisis management.
THE "BASE" FORCE
Although details of the President's new national security
strategy are still being debated, active duty and ready reserve
forces are likely to decrease significantly. The "bottom line"
numbers are likely to be:
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. Army: 12 active, 6 ready reserve divisions
(currently 18 active & 10 reserve) , and 2
"cadre" or reconstitutable reserve divisions
. Air Force: 15 active & 11 reserve TFWs
(currently 36)
181 strategic bombers (currently 268)
550 ICBMs
. Navy: 451 ships (currently 545)
150 surface combatants with 0 battleships
12 aircraft carriers + 1 for training (cur-
rently 14)
13 carrier air wings
. Marine Corps: 160,000 personnel (currently
196, 000) organized in three MEFs with simul-
taneous lift for the assault echelons of 2
MEBs
Sometimes termed the "base force," the new force structure
advocated by General Powell will be organized into four basic
military components: Strategic nuclear offensive and defensive;
Atlantic; Pacific; and a Contingency Force; and four supporting
capabilities: Transportation, Space, Reconstitution, and R&D.
What constitutes those forces will be debated throughout the next
year.
The StrateQic Force
The Strategic Force would include those offensive forces
that survive the START process - perhaps some 4500 to 3000 war-
heads for each side. In their February Congressional testimony,
Secretary Cheney and General Powell stated that they were pre-
pared to halt the construction of OHIO class ballistic missile
submarines at eighteen, not retrofit all of those submarines with
the more advanced TRIDENT II (D-5) missiles, and only consider
the PEACEKEEPER (MX) rail garrison ICBM and small ICBM as R&D
programs without plans for deployment.
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President Bush said in his State of the Union address in
January, that SDI would be refocused only on providing protection
from limited ballistic missile strikes against the U.S., its
forces overseas, and friends and allies. Secretary Cheney out-
lined a reorientation of SDI to a system of Global Protection
Against Limited Strikes (GPALS) -- indicating that it would be
space, ground, and sea-based. The initial objective of GPALS
would be protection against accidental, unauthorized, and/or
limited ballistic missile strikes. The system should only be
about half the size of the Phase I plan associated with SDI. It
is likely that strategic defenses will at least continue as an
R&D program.
The Atlantic Force
The conventional military forces of the U.S. appear to be
headed for both reductions and restructuring. The Atlantic Force
will include residual forces remaining in Europe, those forward-
deployed to Europe, and the continental U.S.-based reinforcing
force (including heavy ground forces). The Atlantic Force would
contain a significant reserve component. This force would be
responsible for Europe, the Middle East, and Southwest Asia in
recognition of the fact that in the future, the threat in the
Middle East is on a par ;ith that of Europe, thus necessitating
the same type of response.
The U.S. military has recommended that it retain in Europe:
2 Army divisions and 3 Air Force TFWs. One CVBG and a MEU-sized
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amphibious ready group will remain deployed continuously in the
Mediterranean Sea or eastern Atlantic Ocean. There will also be
some residual presence in the Middle East.
Atlantic Force forward presence will be backed up by a
powerful reinforcement capability. That capability will consist
of 4 active, 6 reserve, and 2 cadre reserve Army divisions, 2
active and 11 reserve Air Force TFWs, 5 Navy CVBGs, 2 USMC MEBs,
and the USMC reserve component. The Atlantic Force appears to be
the backbone of America's future conventional deterrence.
The Pacific Force
The Pacific Force will include a modest and chiefly maritime
residual forward-based and forward-deployed force remaining in
Korea, Japan and elsewhere in the theater, and reinforcing forces
located in the continental U.S. In Korea, the U.S. will initial-
ly retain one Army division and 1-2 Air Force TFWs. In Japan, 1-
2 Air Force TFWs and one home-based Navy CVBG. A MEU-sized
amphibious ready group will operate in the Western Pacific for
most of each year.
American Army and Air Force power in the Pacific will be
primarily reinforcements; a single light Army division, one Air
Force TFW-, a Hawaii-based USMC MEB, and in the continental U.S.,
there would be an additional Marine Corps MEB and 5 Navy CVBGs.
Modest reserve components in Alaska and Hawaii would be allocated
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to the Pacific Force. In short, the Pacific Force will be an
economy of force operation.
If the Cold War was our original justification for the large
presence of forces in the Pacific, then if the Cold War is over,
it is over in the Pacific as well. If forces and bases are to be
permanently retained overseas, it will have to be for other rea
sons. If the U.S. significantly reduces its forces in Japan,
there is a possibility that there will be arguments to increase
the size and/or capability of the Japanese Armed Forces. Any
such possibility will be watched very carefully by China, the
USSR, and other Pacific nations.
The Continqency7 Force
Perhaps the most dramatic innovation of the recommended
force structure is the creation of a Contingency Force based in
the continental United States. The Contingency Force, according
to the guidelines in the President's Aspen speech, will apparent-
ly be shaped by the need to provide an overseas presence and
response to regional contingencies. It would appear that the
Contingency Force is to be responsible for Latin America and
Africa, not Europe, the Middle East, or Southwest Asia. It is
not clear, but some recent U.S. military reports allude to the
Contingency Force having a role in the "far-flung islands of the
world's oceans." It is also possible that the Contingency Force
may end up with responsibility for South Asia.
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Continental U.S.-based contingency response forces arc not a
new idea. In the 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. military exper-
imented with a series of similar schemes that were eventually
abandoned under the Kennedy Administration. The Army and Air
Force will apparently commit 4 divisions and 7 TFWs to the Con-
tingency Force while the Navy and Marine Corps will provide dual-
committed forces from the Atlantic and Pacific. Most of the
rapid response sealift and all intertheater airlift and all
special forces would belong to the Contingency Force.
The first stage of a Contingency Force in what is termed a
"graduated deterrence response," would consist of Army light &
airborne divisions, USMC MEBs, Special Operations Forces, and
selected Air Force units. This initial component of the Contin-
gency Force would be buttressed as necessary by carrier and
amphibious forces. The third tier of the Contingency Force
appears to be heavier forces with the capability for long-term
sustainability. We have seen this application in Operation
DESERT SHIELD. The Contingency Force would "borrow" heavy
forces, as needed, from the Atlantic Force. The key to under-
standing the new crisis response part of the new national securi-
ty strategy is that it is not keyed to one service or even the
active component having a unilateral capability. Crisis response
in the future appears to be a joint responsibility with a mix of
active and selected reserve units.
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Transportation
Mobility programs proposed by the SECDEF include the ability
to return to Europe with 4 Army divisions, 30 Air Force tactical
fighter squadrons, one Marine Corps MEB, and their associated
support within 10 days. Additional forces would be provided
within 2-3 months. DoD will continue to build toward preposi-
tioned equipment in Europe for 6 Army divisions and their associ-
ated support elements.
For contingencies outside of Europe, the goal is to be able
to provide 5 Army divisions, along with associated air and naval
forces in about 6 weeks. It would appear that ground units would
fly to a future crisis, much as forces assigned to Operation
DESERT SHIELD did to Saudi Arabia. Personnel will then either be
married up with prepositioned equipment or with equipment that
arrives via sea.
Lift will probably include a modest government-owned capa-
bility in a caretaker status and civilian air and sea transporta-
tion assets engaged in normal peacetime trade. The U.S. was able
to generally meet its lift requirements for Operations DESERT
SHIELD with a combination of existing assets, those that were
taken up from trade, and charters of foreign capability. Similar
assumptions will probably be made under the new national security
strategy.
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Air and sealift for a major NATO war in Europe can be put
into the category of forces that could be reconstituted. Recon-
stitution of lift should include: that provided by allies, char-
ters from foreign non-aligned sources, and the activation of
assets placed in storage.
Unilateral Capability?
One of the more interesting questions regarding the Contin-
gency Force and potential intervention by the Atlantic or Pacific
Forces is whether or not the planning assumption includes a
unilateral capability or is the participation of host nations and
allies understood? The JMNA assumes that host nation support and
sufficient infrastructure is available for any major regional
contingency.
"Acting alone" must be viewed in terms of what level of
warfare is being discussed -- strategic (for example, World War
II), operational (campaign sized similar to Operations DESERT
SHIELD or DESERT STORN), or tactical, and whether or not such
operations are essentially nuclear, maritime, or air/land war-
fare. The U.S. will probably reserve the right and maintain the
capability to take unilateral military actions with nuclear
forces and with all types of tactical level warfare, but probably
not at the strategic or operational levels of air/land warfare.
However, we should assume that the U.S. would not be able to
unilaterally mount an opposed contingency operation or campaign
such as DESERT SHIELD with the "base force." One could argue,
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furthermore, that the U.S. probably does not even have this
operational level capability today. Both the SECDEF and the CJCS
were careful in their testimony to the Congress in February, to
project that the "base" force could handle an Operation DESERT
SHIELD or DESERT STOPJ4 but that it might have taken longer before
the forces were prepared to go on the offensive. This answer
assumes, however, that such operations are coalition - not uni-
lateral-based.
The U.S. long has assumed that a major war (at the strategic
level) would only be pursued as a part of alliances, such as NATO
- hence there is no real change at this level of warfare. Simi-
larly, the U.S. has always had a unilateral capability at the
tactical level of warfare and there is no reason to assume that
it will not have this in the future.
NATO INITIATIVES
U.S. forces in Europe, and elsewhere, cannot be changed
without considering commitments made to allies and the planned
employment of American resources in combined operations under
NATO command. While the United States is considering major
changes in strategy and forces, so is NATO. The July 1990 NATO
London Declaration stated that "NATO will rely more heavily on
the ability to build up larger forces if and when they might be
needed." The July Declaration stated that the Alliance too was
preparing a new "military strategy moving away from 'forward
defense'. . . towards a reduced forward presence. " The decla-
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ration also stated that "NATO will field smaller and restructured
active forces" and "will scale back the readiness of active
units, reducing training requirements and the number of exer-
cises."
General John R. Galvin, U.S. Army, SACEUR, recently told the
Defense Planning Committee (DPC) in December that he envisages a
change in his primary combat mission from flexible response and
forward defense to crisis response. The centerpiece of this
capability would be a standing Rapid Reaction Corps centered
about a multinational corps and the existing ACE Mobile Forces.
Should these standing forces not be able to support political
decision making, then additional forces will be mobilized and
regenerated or "reconstituted.,4
According to the NATO London Declaration and General Gal-
vin's DPC remarks, a new NATO war fighting strategy is being
drafted to replace the current strategy of flexible response (MC-
14/3). The overall new NATO strategy will be based upon newly
calculated national commitment force levels. Unilateral program-
ming actions for future forces being undertaken by individual
NATO nations, like the U.S., will obviously affect the warfight-
ing strategy that NATO as a whole will be able to implement as
those programmed forces become operational. Current national
programming actions may stem from revised national views on war,
the threat, or the resources available for defense. This is
exactly what has happened in the United States.
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The new N4ATO strategy will be based upon paragraph 20 of the
London Declaration. According to General Galvin's remarks at
IISS, NATO strategy will have peacetime, crisis, and wartime
responses. Peacetime elements will likely include: enumeration
of national prerogatives, maintenance of alliance cohesion by
integration and multinational forces, intelligence and verifica-
tion of arms control agreements, and force generation prepara-
tion.
The crisis response strategy will likely address: readiness
for the Rapid Reaction Corps, the quick reaction of the alliance
to emerging crises, communication with adversaries, escalation
and deescalation, and the preparation for controlled mobilization
and demobilization. The political goal of a future crisis ap-
pears to be - control and deescalate. NATO initiatives include
more emphasis on mobility and multinationality. Multinational
corps with two or three divisions from different countries paral-
lel existing arrangements for multinational maritime forces.
ISUES FOR DISCUSSION
The issues raised in the President's Aspen speech are numer-
ous, complex, and require discussion. Some of the more important
include: how. do we define our new goals and objectives for both
program and war planning; what is the lasting impact of Opera-
tions DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM; what are the new require-
ments for the intelligence community and for decision-making?
What are the industrial aspects of the new national security
strategy: investrent strategy, conversion, and reconstitution?
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Finally, there are obvious implications for military operations
research and analysis.
Defining Goals & Objectives in Programming & War Planning
Political-military strategic planning generally commences
with: (1), a tabulation of the resources likely to be available,
or (2), an assessment of the threat, or (3), an examination of
the goals and objectives to be attained. The planning process
can start with any of these three factors but it generally does
start with different ones depending upon the type of planning
underway -- war planning for immediate combat operations or
program planning for forces to be de ivered in the future.
In wartime, planning often starts with a tabulation of the
resources available - probably how the military started the
process on December 8, 1941 -- after the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor put significant portions of the Pacific Fleet on the
bottom. Existing plans for war with Japan had to be revised
based upon the numbers and types of surviving forces. Initial
goals were limited by the resources available.
In wartime, nations may also turn first to an examination of
the threat, especially when faced with the need to create major
strategic plans insufficiently researched before the war. The
USSR likely did this after the Germans invaded on June 22, 1941.
Prior to being invaded by Germany, insufficient attention had
been paid to fighting the Germans on Soviet soil on the strategic
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defensive. The Soviet military was forced to develop plans and
execute them in short order based upon a revised threat scenario.
War planning may also start with an examination, analysis,
and ieconsideration of goals and objectives. The U.S. and the
Soviet Union each had initial goals and objectives they attempted
to achieve in the initial stages of World War II but generally
these were limited by the newly revised resources available and
the actual threat as demonstrated by enemy capability. Later,
however, the allies amassed sufficient forces to operate on the
strategic offensive in all theaters and recognized that "uncondi-
tional surrender" was a possible goal. War plans could then be
drawn up with primary consideration given to goals and objectives
rather than resources and the threat. This also underscores that
goals and objectives can and often do change during wars.
Much of the literature devoted to defense planning does not,
however, concern actual war planning, but rather program plan-
ning, used to explain to legislators and the public why certain
types of weapons systems and forces should be purchased and main
tained. There is often some overlap between the initial program
plans and subsequent program plans - but not always. For exam-
ple, the USS MIDWAY was justified in 1940s programming plans to
help defeat Japan. War plans in the 1980s included the USS
MIDW'AY defending Japan. Similarly, program plans after March
1983 included SDI but war plans written that year could not.
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Program planning under PPBS, in the United States, official-
ly starts with an examination and identification of the threa .
There have ilways been implicit unofficial discussions of the
range of resources available and a general consensus on goals
that may have preceded this threat examination. The consensus on
goals is what is being discussed in the Pesident's new national
security strategy.
Current U.S. and Soviet program planning has been drastical-
ly affected by the change in perceptions of the threat facing
these two nations. After years of relying on military prepared-
ness to guarantee peace, each side has apparently seen that what
it took as reasonable steps for self-defense were perceived by
the other side as evidence of aggressive intentions. 5 The Ameri-
can public, and therefore the U.S. Congress, has revised their
world view and made it known that the levels of programming
expenditure devoted to the Soviet threat are simply no longer re
quired. It seems that the major driving factor behind the crea-
tion of the President's new programming strategy is the need to
outline a plan to maintain national defense under a climate of
greatly reduced resources.
Program planning should logically start with goals and
objectives, but in the past, this has rarely occurred. In gener-
al, a fundamental reexamination of goals and objectives has not
been necessary given the generally stable state of political
military relations between the superpowers. Due to the major
changes in the international political climate, we should also
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expect to see the U.S. debate whether or not its programming (or
even wartime) planning should include a unilateral capabilities
or automatically assume standing alliance or ad hoc coalitions
and host nations. There is a tremendous difference in program-
ming based upon the assumption that is made regarding this ques-
tion.
Although the U.S. and NATO never had the opportunity to
develop war plans for an environment that included forces envis-
aged under SDI, there is no need to delay immediate revisions of
war plans for existing forces. There are significant changes to
the international environment, especially the threat, and an
urgent need to reduce defense expenditures - hence plans can be
changed now. This specifically includes our desire and ability
to change now the planned employment of strategic nuclear forces.
Do we need to target facilities and forces in nations that
clearly are no longer enemies? What political benefit would be
gained from targeting areas where restless nationalities are
already struggling against the national government in the USSR?
Will the Soviet military assume that these areas and Eastern
Europe are "safe havens?" Will the USSR create targeting plans
for areas in formerly allied nations? Can both sides change their
targeting fast enough to respond to rapidly changing political
events?
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Similarly, in the conventional realm, there is an obvious
need to immediately revise existing war plans since NATO now
controls both sides of the Fulda Gap. Indeed, General Galvin
told the DPC that "it is clear that the old General Defense Plan
is useless, and I have already rescinded it." There are obvious
components to conventional war planning that should be revisited
and need not await programming decisions.
Conventional war planners should also be already changing
the focus of their efforts from the "big" war with the USSR to
the regional contingencies outlined in the JMNA. War planners
have traditionally devoted most of their efforts to planning for
the most demanding and least likely scenarios -- they should now
devote the bulk of their efforts to the most likely and less
demanding. This redirection in efforts will not come easy and
may require some different types of expertise. New contingency
plans are needed soon so that program planners can have C-in-C
inputs to force requirements, i.e. the forces desired for contin-
gencies may not be the same as we procured for the "big" war.
Impact of Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM
Operation DESERT SHIELD demonstrated that the U.S. can
initially muster sufficient assets from the continental U.S. to
meet a major contingency where there were no forces in being.
The initial deployment of forces in Operation DESERT SHIELD also
seemed to demonstrate that such a force does not require basing
overseas, such as in Europe although additional forces did rede-
ploy from Europe and other overseas locations to the Middle East.
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The developed ports, airfields and available petroleum in Saudi
Arabia may not be available at future contingency locations --
cautioning us to not necessarily use these operations as a model
for the future. It will take analysis of Operations DESERT SHIELD
and DESERT STORM to make a definitive statement on the issue --
but we should review the President's new national security
strategy and the associated force structure now that these tw;o
Operations have run their course.
Once DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM after-action reports are
written, analysts will try to answer the question what systems
appeared to make a difference in the political and military
outcome. Successful use of the PATRIOT anti-missile system is
one that has already suggested to many the value of ABM systems
for the continental U.S. Systems that did not make a major
contribution to Operation DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM will
need to be reevaluated for upgrading or cancellation and replace-
ment. Under the ne.' national security strategy to reconstitute
capabilities useful in a Europe-centered global war with the
USSR, there will be no need to retain systems that do not have a
dual use in the Contingency Force.
There appear to be a number of obvious areas for research
with regard to lessons learned. Some of the more obvious are
whether or not a land campaign was truly required or could our
objectives been accomplished with airpower alone? What lessons do
the Soviets claim that they have learned from our experience?
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Both sides will obviously study the lessons learned, especially
of the Air Campaign, and see if adjustments to military art are
required. If the lessons are that significant, we can expect to
not only see the U.S. consider revisions to the new national
security strategy, but also the Soviet Union start their internal
military doctrine debate anew.
New Requirements for Intelligence
The changes suggested by the Bush Administration, if accept-
ed by the U.S. Congress, will place an enormous burden on the
intelligence community. Although one might argue that logically,
concomitant with such fundamental changes intelligence appropria-
tions should increase, it is probable that they will decrease
like defense spending.
President Bush's remarks in Aspen are programming remarks
and do not reflect changes in the current defense plans for the
U.S. or U.S. forces which would fight today under NATO. The
intelligence community will still need to provide all of their
traditional services until the new international security envi-
ronment takes hold. This fact should satisfy critics who will
complain that we are overlooking the Soviet threat or that the
events that we see in the USSR are simply a ruse or represent an
attempt to secure a breathing space prior to a massive rearma-
ment. In short, there is a current intelligence requirement that
remains well focused on the existing Soviet threat.
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In addition to providing intelligence products vis-a-vis the
USSR to support current war planning, the intelligence community
must also provide new products to support programming for the
future Atlantic Force. For example, we need quick rough answers
to approximations of how much the USSR will devote in the future
or is devoting to defense, given other needs. Naturally, the
intelligence community has been attempting to provide this infor-
mation all along, but with new information available, we can
perhaps refine our assessments. Similarly, we need to identify
the new international goals and objectives that serve as the
requirements for future Soviet forces. Perhaps the time has come
to jointly game with the USSR the deescalation of crises. 6 If we
do this, we will need to "game the game" before hand in order to
not give away more than we expect to learn.
The bulk of the U.S. and NATO national intelligence communi-
ties are oriented toward understanding and countering the Soviet
threat. Although it took many years, the West eventually grew
sophisticated at understanding the Soviet perspective on doc-
trine, strategy, arms control, and the like. Our intelligence
agencies and associated policy offices are substantially less
competent at analyzing, predicting behavior, and conducting net
assessments for the rest of the world. Obviously that situation
is already remedying itself vis-a-vis Iraq, but there remain many
areas of the world for which this conclusion remains true. The
Contingency Force will need strong supporting intelligence capa-
bilities.
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We need more in-depth intelligence capabilities for new
areas of the world. Deficiencies in this area should be correct-
ed, and quickly. Is the intelligence community prepared to
provide players in seminar and war games that can represent the
behavior of nations other than our traditional enemies? 7  We
recently felt comfortable enough with our knowledge of the USSR
to create artificial intelligence-like models to represent Soviet
behavior in expert systems that substituted machine actions for
human behavior. Are we ready to do this for non-Soviet actors?
Flexibility in shifting intelligence assets from one set of
collection targets to rapidly emerging priority targets is essen-
tial to support the contingency response element of the Presi-
dent's new national security strategy. Continued unimpeded
access to space underlies support for the use of American mili-
tary forces and has been identified by General Powell as one of
the key supporting capabilities.
As the intelligence community re-/enters new areas, it will
have to make some adjustments in the manner that it does busi-
ness. Formerly, when intelligence analysts differed, the debate
could be settled by an assessment of the data. With political
and economic intelligence, it is often the methodology rather
than the data that settles disputes.
We have to build capabilities to match our stated need for
new types of information. Economic and other forms of strategic
intelligence, for example, may become relatively more important
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than extremely costly technical intelligence systems designed to
provide tactical warning. 8 The net impact of the President's new
national security strategy is that the intelligence community may
have to undergo a fundamental reexamination of its missions and
priorities.
Requirements for Decision-Makinq
NATO used to talk in terms of a few days warning (the time
to detect an invasion) and another few days for decision. Mobi-
lization and return of initial American troops and air forces
from the continental U.S. to Europe would take around 10 days.
Hence the canonical 14-day scenario arose, with enormous effort
devoted to the assessment of theater-strategic operations and
campaigns that would be fought by forces that could be brought to
bear. We became very adept at calculating theater-wide force
ratios for the first thirty or forty-five days of a war in Eu-
rope.
The question arises: how long would it take the Soviets to
again be in such a position to cause the U.S. to worry about a
European crisis that could escalate to warfare and perhaps be
over within a month and a half? Similarly, how long does the
Soviet military feel that it would need to respond to an unantic-
ipated rebuilding of Western military potential in Europe?
From the JMNA, it appears that in the event of a superpower
crisis, the prime programming assumption is that armed conflict
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will not occur for at least 24 months. This is not exactly the
same thing as assuming that we will have two year's strategic
warning and response time; warning might be provided and ignored
or warning might not be recognized. For programming purposes,
however, U.S. planners should assume that the old theater strate-
gic operation, or a surge operational-strategic level attack
across the old inter-German border with the Pyrenees as goal,
could not be mounted without the U.S. intelligence community
obtaining and understanding indicators two years in advance.
For program planning, we also assume that during this two
year period, the U.S. can reconstitute forces for defense of
Europe while the Soviets are doing the same for their offensive
capability. During that time, we assume that we can re-build
forces and materials instead of maintaining them on active duty,
in the Ready Reserves, or prepositioned in Europe. U.S. forces
reconstituted for a major war in Europe need only be sufficient
to deter or defend against a Soviet attack - not launch a theater
strategic offensive operation.
Succinctly, the need for the old, massive, short-term (14-
day) mobilization has diminished. The threat planning assumption
that once drove NATO toward a two-week mobilization requirement
has been replaced with a threat, for programming purposes, that
now gives the alliance two years to respond.
We need to more fully discuss this two years period. For
example, should we assume that we will have two years to recon-
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stitute forces from the time that strategic warning is provided
and accepted by the intelligence community? If so, which intel-
ligence community - the U.S., NATO, all NATO nations, or some new
international command? Perhaps the assumption is two years
following the government's accepting that something is wrong that
needs to be redressed? Which government or governments and does
NATO collectively have to agree to react? Is it two years assum-
ing that we can find something significant and recognize it at
the time?
Two years does not mean that the USSR cannot launch an
intercontinental nuclear strike against the continental U.S., or
an attack at the tactical or perhaps even the operational level
in Europe in less time than that. There is probably some period
of time associated with still realistic, but lesser, threats from
the Soviet Union that is less than two years and more than two
weeks. A major regional contingency involving the USSR in Europe
should be and is in our program planning contingencies. Indeed,
the U.S. should include in its family of programming scenarios a
major regional contingency involving the USSR in Europe but
limited only to that theater.
Even accepting the ability of the intelligence community to
provide a two years strategic warning, there is controversy over
what governments will do when faced with the inconclusive evi-
dence provided initially. General Galvin told a group of former
SHAPE officers that two years warning time should be looked at in
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the context of the warning provided to and the response made by
the United States from September 1939 to December 1941. Post-
Stalin Soviet military authors are never reluctant to remind
their readers that despite overwhelming intelligence evidence of
an impending invasion by Nazi Germany, and despite the recommen-
dations for mobilization from his military staffs, the USSR was
not prepared for the invasion that actually did take place in
June 1941.
If Western history of non-reactions to rearmament by totali-
tarian nations and violations of arms control agreements is a
guide, we should assume that democracies will: (1), delay deci-
sions to rearm for many good reasons - such as different inter-
pretations of ambiguous intelligence data, the desire to deesca-
late a crisis, etc., (2), deny that a change in the behavior of a
former opponent has taken place or, if it has, is not strategi-
cally significant or not precisely a violation of an agreement,
and (3), even suppress the intelligence and findings of facts
that do not support government policy. Linking the behavior of a
nation to a formal agreement, such as arms control, takes the
reporting and interpretation of data away from analysts in the
intelligence community and makes it the province of lawyers and
politicians.
We will need to make a study of the decision-making patterns
of nations when faced with decisions similar to one that NATO
governments will face when presented with ambiguous evidence
which, sore might argue, constitutes "proof" that the USSR, or
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the Russian Republic in a new USSR confederation, is violating
the "understandings" or treaties that codify the new internation-
al security environment. NATO reactions will be inhibited by the
arms control and confidence building measures that we adopt over
the next few years.
War planners, unlike program planners, are not required to
use "best case" assumptions and are therefore authorized to
formulate their plans on less optimistic suppositions. Hence,
redirection of programming planners to the "best case" (two years
warning) does not necessarily influence war planning for current
forces. Nor does it necessarily deny governmental decision-
makers access to alternative intelligence assessments based upon
current capabilities rather than program assumption intentions.
The military should include in their family of actual war
plans, plans based upon the track record of their governments
acting courageously in response to provocation. For example, the
military is not limited from drafting internal war plans that
assume that authorization for the mobility of existing forces and
the mobilization of reserves will not be granted until the com-
mencement of hostilities (M=C=D).
Decision-making studies to support program and current war
planning should span the gamut of possible scenarios. At one end
of the spectrum is the "worst case," of NATO reconstituting its
forces within the two years predicted, but withholding the au-
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thority to mobilize forces out of garrison and respond to tacti-
cal warning until an attack by the USSR takes place, is verified,
reported to the national and allied command authorities, and an
authorization to respond is communicated to the field. In this
scenario, we assume that the Soviet military machine was able to
come back strong and perhaps even be "invited" into Eastern
Europe.
The related "best case" would be if all forces were allowed
to report to their NATO-assigned positions, ready for a stillborn
Soviet threat generated during two years of economic and politi-
cal chaos. Perhaps in this situation, NATO might have an option
for offensive tactical and even operational-level warfare against
the USSR.
At the other end of the spectrum is the other "worst case,"
of a USSR that takes a full two years to rearm in such a manner
that it obtains a significant advantage in its estimation of the
correlation of forces and means. The scenario would assume that
NATO nations failed to make bold decisions when faced with ambig-
uous evidence by the intelligence community. The associated
"best case" would be a NATO that made the bold decisions and
matched the Soviet regeneration with their own. Both sides would
then be fully reconstituted and on a wartime command and control
footing and deployment.
There are numerous other scenarios that need investigation.
Despite the lack of credibility accorded a "bolt-from-the-blue"
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ground attack by the USSR during the new international security
environment, we should analyze this scenario to develop intelli-
gence indicators we should monitor to ensure against such a
possibility.
It is even conceivable that Eastern European nations might
ask Soviet, or Russian, troops back into their nations 9 to coun-
teract what they perceive to be a threat from Germany. That
scenario can build upon existing studies. Differences with
today's scenarios might include reconstitution at national loca-
tions but failure to deploy forces from home garrisons and allow
their transfer to NATO. Other possibilities include using por-
tions of the programmed Pacific and Contingency Forces in addi-
tion to the Atlantic Force to respond to a European crisis.
War planners: will also wrestle with how much time and what
type of decisions are necessary during the initial combat actions
in a crisis, before forces are eiLner called up from the reserves
or reconstituted in full. During this period, presumably both
superpowers would act defensively. How long should we assume
that this period will last? Should we have one set of assump-
tions for programming and another for war planning? It is very
likely that programming will assume a longer defensive period
than do operational war planners.
NATO exercise and simulated military decision-making has
traditionally assumed that the alliance political structure would
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make decisions, which would then be carried out by near-simulta-
neous actions taken by all member nations. In a restructured
NATO alliance that is more political than military, and exists in
a new international security environment, NATO and national mili
tary commanders might have to make future plans based upon a
likely decision-making process that has member nations making
unilateral actions prior to those of the alliance as a whole.
National decisions taking preeminence, in turn, would re-
quire Alliance planning for sequential rather than simultaneous
military operations. Similarly, planning for allied, or combined
forces, military cperations may take second place to national
planning. Future military planning by NATO may stress rombined
or joint operations but with forces retained under national
command. All of these topics are currently being discussed by
the appropriate military commands.
Crisis decision-making should also be reviewed with the
lessons of the post World War II era firmly in mina. Not all
crises will require decisions at the same pace; some crises are
slow to build, others are more fast-paced. Some crises occur
with armed conflict imminent while others happen after the out-
break of hostilities. Measured responses need to include the
full gamut -- from a minor show of force to a major insertion of
all types of troops. Scenarios need to be looked at that include
a f<vorable outcome to a worst-case response. A building-block
approach would appear to be an appropriate analogy.
J6
These and other scenarios should be augmented with the most
sophisticated techniques available to learn lessons of wars and
campaigns yet to be fought. An artificial history could be
written of alternative futures so that the military can better
advise their political leadership on the most suitable courses of
action for decisions they should make today.
Investment Strategy and Conversion
The major implication of the two-year big war warning of a
Europe-centered global war with the USSR is that American pro-
gramming strategy will shift its focus to the threats presented
in other areas of the world. Until now, the unstated relation-
ship of the threat to programmed forces was, generally, that U.S.
forces would meet the challenge of the most demanding threat, the
USSR, and assume that they could also cope with lesser contingen-
cies. That basic assumption was generally not entirely true and
now will be essentially reversed: forces will be acquired to meet
the challenges of the more likely, less demanding, threats assum-
ing that they are useful against the more unlikely but greater
threat posed by a Soviet Union that decides to rearm.
This will be a new planning assumption for America, new for
its allies, and somewhat impractical for the near term - or until
we see substantial changes in Soviet maritime and nuclear force
structure to match what we know are reductions in the ground and
air forces. The intelligence community will need to advise
Western governments when their strategic nuclear and maritime
postures can be relaxed.
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Implicit in the reconstitution portion of the new national
security strategy is the retention of capability to produce
equipment and supplies that have not been maintained. Not all
firms will have to convert, nor should they be allowed to convert
to the civilian non-defense sector. Government could regulate
the decline but it appears prepared to allow the market to deter-
mine survivors.
Reconstitution
Reconstitution has three essential sub-components: mobiliza-
tion, military force reconstitution, and industrial reconstitu-
tion. Mobilization will provide the ability to respond to crises
with an active duty and reserve force mix. Military force and
industrial reconstitution, however, are areas in which the U.S.
has not had active interests for some years. Reconstitution must
provide, primarily in the European theater - but not only there,
additional forces and military hardware for a major war with the
assumption that no combat takes place for two years. Reconstitu-
tion time goals can be somewhat vague; since what is really
required is that we need to convince the Soviet Union, and Euro-
pean nations, that we can reconstitute a credible
deterrence/defense faster than the USSR can reconstitute their
offense. Reconstitution in Europe is only possible with a ccn-
tinued alliance structure such as NATO.
The new cadre reserve divisions will be able to restore
combat ready status in 12-18 months. The individual ready re-
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serve or conscription will obviously be a low cost methods of
managing the necessary manpower pool required for reconstitution.
Additional goals for reconstitution will obviously be provided as
staffs wrestle more with the concept - but some initial areas to
investigate might include: sealift and intertheater airlift,
strategic air and missile defenses, and short-range and naval
nuclear weapons.
Some of the military capability that America and her allies
need to retain should be contained in existing active duty and
ready reserve forces. On-hand equipment and supplies for those
ready forces is needed. Some of the equipment and supplies will
need to be stockpiled and prepositioned. Maritime prepositioning
offers flexibility that has recently been demonstrated in the
Middle East. However, not all of the materials for all types of
war need to be readily available.
Implicit in the President's new national security strategy
is the capability of tooling-up for wartime production within two
years for a major war in Europe and less than that for lengthy
contingency operations. General Powell stated that this ability
to reconstitute was one of the critical underlying supporting
capabilities of the new national security strategy. This capa-
bility will consist primarily of the knowledge, skills, and tools
to respond within the timelines now specified. This concept is
not new and we should review the history of planning assumptions
and industry's ability to respond in the 1930s.
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Dr. Fred Ikle, former Undersecretary of Defense (Policy),
was a proponent of preprogrammed crisis budgets and industrial
responses to bridge the gap between peacetime and wartime.
1 0
Industrial mobilization, instead of military mobilization or the
deployment of troops, might form the basis of an adequate govern-
mental response to ambiguous warning indicators. Ikle proposed a
series of industrial alert conditions, similar to those found in
the military, which would trigger specific actions. Actions
would be less threatening because they would not result in an
immediate increase in military capability.
A "graduated deterrence response" could well involve a
"graduated industrial response." This response is not the same
type of response that the government has already ordered in 1987
under the Graduated Mobilization Response (GMR) concept -- that
program being used to support national mobilization for crises
and war with existing forces and strategies. GMR remains a high
priority program to support regional contingency response. There
is no reason contracts cannot be let ahead of time for both a
response to a major war and for contingencies.
Although we can speak abstractly about having plans and
passing budgets ahead of the need to do so, economists must help
government ascertain how much money would be required to recon-
stitute the defense industry. If that money is earmarked for
other purposes, then financial planning should include tracking
sufficient governmental short-term money that can be quickly
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diverted to defense -- if the GMR and reconstitution part of the
new national security strategy is to have teeth.
The reconstitution of industrial capability appears to be
the single most demanding element of the new national security
strategy. The JMNA states that "it would likely be 6 to 24
months before industrial base mobilization or surge production
could begin to deliver critical items. . .by the end-FY 1997, it
is estimated that it would take 2 to 4 years to restore produc-
tion capability to 1990 levels for items whose lines have gone
'cold'." Fortunately, the Soviet Union is rated with the same
capability. Clearly, the U.S. will have to design programs to
monitor the ability to meet reconstitution targets, to test
capabilities, to enhance the credibility of our response and to
monitor the Soviet ability to do the same.
Reconstitution is fundamentally oriented toward the U.S.
contribution to the defense of Europe in the face of a regenerat-
ed Soviet conventional threat. The U.S. need not reconstitute
the 1990-era conventional force it had forward-deployed to Eu-
rope. New technologies, especially in air breathing systems, may
offer the same or even increased combat potential with fewer
ground troops. Nuclear weapons, especially those based at sea,
and maritime forces offer the U.S. an ability to fully meet its
military commitment under the North Atlantic Treaty without an
extensive deployment of any ground or air forces on European
soil.
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MILITARY OPERATIONS RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS
The operations analysis and political science communities
will need to cooperate like they never have before. 11 Military
operations analysis has previously concentrated on investigating
issues posed in a political-military environment that was not
subject for debate. Those assumptions are no longer valid. The
old European-based war scenarios with two weeks warning and
mobilization are simply not of very much interest anymore.
The military operations analysis community needs to reorient
itself to measurements of regeneration and reconstitution where
the timelines are measures in months and years and not days or
weeks. Strategic warning, decision making, non-NATO battlefields
(ashore and at sea), manpower and personnel planning, resource
allocation, test and evaluation, combat models, and gaming and
simulation are all areas that will need fundamental readjustment
due to the new international security environment.
One technique for viewing alternative futures is that of
path gaming. These are political-military games that identify
interesting alternative paths to a desired future and examines
them simultaneously with different groups of players. Gaming,
naturally, is no substitute for solid analysis. Gaming, however,
can provide new insight and supplements more traditional methods
of dealing with alternative futures.
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Governments will become more refined at using means, other
than military forces, to influence the behavior of other nations
- hence these tools will also need to be studied as a part of our
"graduated deterrence response." A racent Soviet foru "Civic
Control Over Security," sponsored by the magazine Mezhdunarodnava
Zhizn and the School for the Strategy of Socio-Intellectual
Enterprise in Rostov-on-Don, highlighted the vulnerability of the
USSR to economic sanctions as the USSR becomes tied into the
world economy and less self-sufficient. 12 In short, the military
operations research community will need to integrate itself into
analysis involving other tools of statecraft rather than consid-
ering itself a discipline that can exist unto itself.
For example, new research may evaluate how successful eco-
nomic sanctions have been in the past and as a supplement to
Operation DESERT SHIELD. Apparently, sanctions were not as
successful as some would have desired since the U.S. and allied
coalition nations launched Operation DESERT STORM. What is the
appropriate mix of economic sanctions as a precursor to military
operations and a follow-on, once the military campaign is com-
pleted? Economic tools are even more difficult to use than in the
past as multi-national corporations become less responsive to
national governments. The intelligence community will have to
provide new types of information to decision makers to allow them
to assess the capabilities of economic and other sanctions.
In short, military operations research and analysis will
become more complicated and require the cooperation of special-
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ists in other disciplines. This will mean that the government
should devise a strategy to manage all of the studies that will




(1) The views expressed by the author are his alone and do not
necessarily represent the position of the U.S. government, De-
partmnent of Defense, or the U.S. Navy. This paper is an edited
version of a substantially longer Naval Postgraduate School
Technical Report, "America Promises to Come Back: A New National
Strategy," NPS-NS-91-003A, May 13, 1991, 153 pp. available from
DTIC. This report was prepared as a result of research sponsored
by the Director of Net Assessment in the Office of the Secretary
of Defense, the Director of Long Range Planning in the Office of
the Under Secretary of Defense, the Director, Competitive Strate-
gies, in the Office of the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense, and the Director of Defense Policy at the National
Security Council. Full citations are available in that report.
(2) Dick Cheney, Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to the
President and the ConQress, January 1991, p. 3.
(3) Indeed, this subject in mentioned in their new draft mili-
tary doctrine. See: "On the Military Doctrine of the USSR
(Draft)," Moscow Voyennava Mysl in Russian, Special Issue, signed
to press November 30, 1990 (JPRS-UMT-91-001-L, January 3, 1991,
p. 16).
(4) There appears to be a definite difference in the use of the
term "reconstitution" by NATO and as envisaged by the President
and Secretary Cheney. NATO officials have been talking in terms
of mobilization over a longer period of time rather than the
creation of wholly new forces. A similar problem exists even in
the U.S. The U.S. Army uses the term "reconstitution" to mean
both a return of operationally deployed units to pre-hostilities
levels of capability as well as to rebuild forces as envisaged by
Secretary Chene'.
(5) ~or examples of possible Soviet misperceptions of the U.S.
military buildup of the 1980s, see commentary by ex-KGB Officer
Oleg Gordievsky as recently published widely in the West. Oleg
Gordievsky, "Pershing Paranoia in the Kremlin," London The Times
in English, February 27, 1990, pp. 12-13 (FBIS-SOV-90-052-A,
March 16, 1990, pp. 11-15); and an excerpt of the new book KGB:
The Inside Story, by Christopher Andrew in cooperation with
Gordievsky, was published in the U.S. by Time, Vol. 136, No. 17,
October 22, 1990, pp. 72-82 (page 80-82 are of most interest).
(C) Suggested by General-Major Valentin Larionov in "Combat
Readiness and Security: Will People Stop Playing at War?" Moscow
Ne,; lies in Lngiis, flo. 3/, September 12-18, 1989, p. 14; and
by General-Major Yuriy Kirshin in "Why is Military Reform
Needed?" Moscow New Times in English, No. 12, March 20-26, 1990
(FBIS-SOV-90-066, April 5, 1990, p. 69).
(7) The failure by the U.S. to capture North Vietnamese behavior
with "red" team players in late 1960s - early 1970s politico-
military war games has been address by General Bruce Palmer, Jr.
45
in his The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam,
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1984, p. 29.
(8) This fact has not gone unnoticed by the Soviet Union. See:
I. Kulkov, "Is the CIA Changing? U.S. Intelligence in the Era of
Glasnost," Moscow Krasnava Zvezda in Russian, January 3, 1991,
1st Ed., p. 3 (FBIS-SOV-91-003, January 4, 1991, pp. 6-7). On
the other hand, from published U.S. reports, the DoD is avoiding
any entry into economic intelligence. See: William Matthews,
"Intelligence Reorganization Focuses on Cuts, Mergers," Navy
Times, May 13, 1991, p. 13.
(9) As far-fetched as this sounds, it is interesting to note
that exactly this scenario was examined at a forum "Civic Control
Over Security" that took place in Rostov-on-Don. The forum was
sponsored by the magazine Mezhdunarodnava Zhizn and the School
for Strategy of Socio-Intellectual Enterprise. See: Konstantine
Ovchinnikov, "'Independent' War Games Described," Moscow New
Times in English, No. 39, October 1, 1990, p. 32 (JPRS-UIA-90-
017, November 6, 1990, p. 1).
(10) Fred C. Ikle, "Industrial Mobilization Planning: Critical
to National Defense," based upon remarks to the Society of Manu-
facturing Engineers Conference, Detroit, November 9, 1987, print-
ed in Defense 88, January/February 1988, pp. 15-18.
(11) The encouragement for operations research practitioners to
delve into the world of strategy, and the perception that they
often do not, was addressed in Craig W. Kirkwood's, "Does Opera-
tions Research Address Strategy?" Operations Research, Vol. 38,
No. 5, September-October 1990, pp. 747-751.
(12) Konstantine Ovchinnikov, "'Independent' War Games De-
scribed, Moscow New Times in English, No. 39, October 1990, p. 32




)udley Know Library 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100




Director, Net Assessment, OSD/NA Room 3A930
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301
4. RADM Donald Pilling, USN
Director, Defense Policy, OEB Room 380
National Security Council Staff
17 Pennsylvania Avenue
Washington, DC 20301
5. CAPT Jerry Murphy, USN I
Chief Strategic Planning
USD A PI/SP Room 3E16
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301
6. Dr. Daniel Goure/LTC Bruce MacDonald, USAF
Competitive Strategies Office
OSD/OPDUSD (S&R) (CSO), PNT Room 1E801/5
Office of the Secretary of Defense
Washington, DC 20301
7. LCI)R Ed vard S. Smith, Jr., USN
HIQ/DNA/NASF, Defense Nuclear Agency
6801 Telegraph Rd.
Alexandria, VA 223 1
8. Dr. James J. Tritten, Associate Professor
Commander, U.S. Navy (Ret.)
Department of National Security Affairs (NS/TR)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
9. Rcsearch Administration (Code 81)
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 93943-5100
